Abstract
Enlargement of the European Union and the globalization process signifi cantly aff ect tax systems and fi scal policies of individual countries. The level and structure of tax burden is o en discussed in the European Union. Economic theory suggests that differences in taxation may play a role in explaining diff erences in economic performance. Current economic development forces governments to fi nd solutions how to support the economic growth and to consolidate public fi nance. There are diff erent views of how this problem should be dealt with in general and also applied tools of individual countries have various forms -from ad hoc tax measures to substantial structural reforms. It is questionable whether the governments may aff ect the econo mic performance of countries through changes in taxation.
The aim of the paper is to analyze changes in taxation and their impact on economic growth in the European Union. The analysis is performed on adjusted annual panel data of 24 EU countries in a period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Panel regression with fi xed eff ects is used as a basic method of research. The paper is structured as follows: The fi rst section of the paper introduces basic relations between taxation and the economic growth and the aim of paper. The second part provides a basic literature review. The third part presents methods and resources for modeling changes in taxation and their impact on economic growth in the European Union. The fourth section reports results and discussions of the estimation. The panel regression is based on analysis the eff ect of total tax quota changes on GDP growth in model 1, of changes in its components (social contribution, direct and indirect tax quotas) in model 2 and of corporate and personal income tax quota changes in model 3. The last section presents conclusions.
Literature review
The theoretical eff ect of taxation on economic performance is not an obvious matter. A higher level of tax burden can be seen as a serious obstacle to sustained improvement of the economic level of the country. Scully (1991,93-96) Both neoclassical and Keynesian theoretical models, for example, predict that higher taxes reduce economic activity, even though there is less agreement on the exact mechanisms that generate this result. On the other hand, taxes may be a benefi t for the economy because the taxes are the basic source for fi nancing public goods and services, and in this way can increase the living standards and wealth of the whole society. If collected taxes are used effi ciently, provided public services can increase productivity of human and fi xed capital in the private sector and promote long-term economic growth.
There is voluminous literature on the eff ects of taxes on the economy and its rate of growth (Leibfritz, Thornton and Bibbee, 1997; Barro, 1991; Slemrod, 1995) . However, using statistical data for comparing levels of taxation and economic performance also does not provide unequivocal conclusions. We can fi nd countries with high economic performance, which have a low tax burden (e.g. United States), but also countries that have high economic performance with high tax burden (e.g. Scandinavian countries).
But there are many studies which present negative relationships between taxes and economic growth, and recommend lowering tax rates. Plosser (1992) fi nds a signifi cant negative correlation between the level of taxes on income and profi ts (as a share of GDP) and growth of real per capita GDP. King and Rebelo (1990) simulate changes in the income tax by applying an endogenous growth model and fi nd that an increase from 20 per cent to 30 per cent reduces the rate of growth by 2 percentage points. Scully (2000) claims that countries in which government takes more than 43% of national income in the form of taxes could collect more revenue by lowering their tax rates. Further, tax rates anywhere close to 43% have devastating eff ects on economic growth. Hill (2008) estimated the growth-maximizing size of states for the United States in 1960-1990 was between 9% and 29% of GDP. Also Romero-Á vila and Strauch (2008) state that government consumption and direct taxation negatively aff ect growth rates of GDP per capita in the EU15 in the last 40 years. Johansson et al. (2008, 2) investigate the design of tax structures to promote economic growth. "Corporate taxes are found to be most harmful for growth, followed by personal income taxes, and then consumption taxes. Recurrent taxes on immovable property appear to have the least impact." Lee and Gordon (2005) explore how tax policies in fact aff ect a country's growth rate, using cross-country data during 1970-1997. The coeffi cient estimates suggest that a cut in the corporate tax rate by 10% will raise the annual growth rate by 1 to 2 percentage points. Karras and Furceri (2009) examine the eff ects of changes in taxes on economic growth. Using annual data from 1965 to 2003 for a panel of 19 European economies, the results show that the eff ect of an increase in taxes on real GDP per capita is negative and persistent. An increase in the total tax rate by 1% of GDP has an eff ect on real GDP per capita of minus 0.5% to minus 1% in the long run. The fi ndi ngs also imply that increases in social security contributions or taxes on goods and services have larger negative eff ects on per capita output than increases in inco me tax.
METHODS AND RESOURCES
It should be noted that the goal of this empirical analysis is not to fi nd the ideal model describing the behavior illustrated by the variables, but a statistically signifi cant correlation between explanatory (the tax burden which is expressed as the tax quota) and explaining variable (economic performance which is measured by GDP growth). We use the panel data and calculations which are made in the program Eviews.
Methodology of the analysis is based on study of Plojhar and Tomšík (2004) , who analyzed the infl uence of taxation on economic performance in OECD countries . We use panel data as panel data have both cross-sectional and time series dimensions and the application of regression models to fit econometric models are more complex than those for simple cross-sectional data sets. As Dougherty (2007) and Cipra (2008) wrote, there are several reasons for the increasing interest in panel data sets. An important one is that their use may offer a solution to the problem of bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity, a common problem is the adaptability of models with cross-sectional data sets. A second reason is that it may be possible to exploit panel data sets to reveal dynamics that are diffi cult to detect with cross-sectional data. A third attraction of panel data sets is that they o en have very large numbers of observations. Panel data modelling combines elements of time series analysis and elements of regression analysis.
We performed both fi xed eff ects and random effects regressions before analysis. A Durbin-WuHausman test indicated signifi cant diff erences in the coeffi cients so model with fi xed eff ects is used in the paper. A panel model with fi xed eff ects can be formally written as:
where y it depends on a set of K explanatory variables x it and the constants are specifi c to the i-th unit (country) at time t, at the same time but are constant.  ' is the vector dimension 1xK constants and  i is a constant representing the eff ects of those variables, which are characteristic of the i-th observation.  it error component represents non-signifi cant eff ects of variables inherent in the i-team observations and a given time interval. Furthermore, we assume it does not correlate with the vector x it , for all the i and t, and it comes from independent identical distribution with zero mean and constant dispersion. This model is o en referred to as a basic model representing the structure of panel data. The panel consists of 24 EU members -Bulgaria, Romania and Malta were excluded due to lack of data. Basic panel model identifi ers are country i and time t. The paper uses adjusted annual data on total tax quota and its sub-components (direct taxes, indirect taxes, social contribution, personal income taxes, corporate income taxes) from Eurostat. Annual cyclically adjusted data on GDP at market prices are taken from Eurostat and they are based on an accrual basis. Expressing GDP in PPS (purchasing power standards) eliminates diff erences in price levels between countries, and calculations on a per head basis allows for the comparison of economies signifi cantly diff erent in absolute size. Tab. I presents basic variables and their descriptive statistics. All taxes are expressed as % of GDP and they are understood as a tax quota (TTOT -total tax quota, TDIR -direct taxes, TIND -indirect taxes, TSC -social contribution, CIT -corporate income taxes, PIT -personal income taxes).
Model specifi cation
A causal relationship between the variables can be simply written:
This means that the amount of GDP is the result of the infl uence of individual components of tax quota. It is necessary to test the stationary time series before starting econometric analysis due to the assumes of panel regression. For this purpose panel unit root tests are used. A stationary time series is required because any variable which stochastically permanently departs from its mean value cannot be aff ected by long period variable, which returns to its mean value (eff ect may be only in a short term). Recent literature suggests that panel-based unit root tests have higher power than unit root tests based on individual time series. Panel unit root tests are similar, but not identical, to unit root tests carried out on a single series (Verbeek, 2000) . We used panel unit root tests (Levin, Lin and Chu, Breitung, Im, Pesaran and Shin, Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests) and they identifi ed non-stationary of all level data. Therefore, it is not possible to analyze the eff ect of taxation on economic performance based on level data. Next we calculated and tested the fi rst diff erence of time series with the aim to comply assumptions of panel regression. The fi rst diff erence (absolute change in values) of GDP is expressed as:
Analogically, we used the same indication and procedure for all the remaining time series (ΔTTOT, ΔTDIR, ΔTIND, ΔTSC, ΔCIT, ΔPIT). We also calculated and tested the fi rst diff erence of logarithmic data for the GDP (rate of growth):
Panel unit root tests confi rm that all time series are stationary at the fi rst diff erence I(1). For details see Szarowská (2010) . All time series are stationary even at 1% level of signifi cance and can be used for modelling changes of GDP growth depending on changes of the tax quota and its components 1 . 
I: Descriptive statistics of variables (312 observations)

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION -IMPACT OF TAX CHANGES ON GROWTH
Time series of growth rate and diff erences of all variables are stationary and therefore they can be used for panel regression. The panel regression is based on analysis the eff ect of total tax quota changes on GDP growth in model 1, of changes in its components (social contribution, direct and indirect taxes) in model 2 and of CIT and PIT changes in model 3.
Model 1
Model 1 is estimated in a very simple form:
where TR_GDP it is rate of growth GDP and it depends on a fi rst diff erence of total tax quota TTOT it .  i is a constant representing the eff ects of those variables, which are characteristic of the i-th observation. We suppose that GDP growth depends only on total tax quota changes (ΔTTOT 
Model 2
Model 1 is very simplistic as total tax quota does not refl ect changes of its individual components. Model 2 refl ects changes of tax quota components: direct taxes TDIR 3 , indirect taxes TIND 4 and social contribution TSC on GDP growth.
The results in Tab. III express the negative eff ect of direct taxes and social contribution on GDP growth and the positive impact of indirect tax changes on GDP growth. The eff ect of direct taxes is statistically signifi cant, while other variables are not statistically signifi cant at standard level. The coeffi cient suggests that a cut in the direct taxes by one percentage point raises the growth rate by a 0.43 percentage point. Due to the values of the adjusted coeffi cient of determination residues are not autocorrelated. Fig. 1 shows how the actual data correspond to the estimated values. Source: Author's calculations 2 The estimations with lags does not confi rm statistically signifi cant eff ect of tax changes on GDP growth at standard levels. Detailed results of estimation are available on reguest. 3 Direct taxes are imposed on a concrete subject, which cannot transfer this tax on somebody else, e. g. personal and corporate income taxes. 4 Indirect taxes are value added tax, consumer tax, customs and other indirect taxes. Indirect taxes are imposed on a concrete subject as well, but it can transfer them on some other subject.
We also calculated estimations with time lag. We used information criteria (Akaike info criterion, Schwarz criterion and Hannan-Quinn criterion) and it seems that the model with 1 year lag is the most appropriate. Equation with 1 year lag has following form:
An estimation with 1 year lag refl ects statistically signifi cant negative eff ects of direct taxes on GDP growth at 10% level and positive eff ect of indirect taxes on GDP growth at 5% level. Regression coeffi cients are higher than in the previous equation: 0.65% and −0.44%. Cross-sectional nature and persistence of taxes can be one of the reasons explaining this development. Indirect taxes have impact on demand and positively eff ect on economic growth. Direct taxes can have an impact on GDP by aff ecting labour utilization and labour productivity or both. However, it is generally diffi cult to assess the overall eff ect of the tax changes on GDP. For example, changes in any single tax may simultaneously aff ect several determinants of GDP. The eff ects of changes in taxation o en depend also on the design of other policies and institutions. Thus, the negative eff ect of labour taxes on employment is o en dependent on wage setting institutions which determine e.g. minimum wages, which negatively affect labour cost and then GDP growth.
Model 3
Model 2 confi rmed statistically signifi cant negative eff ect of direct taxes on GDP growth. Model 3 is focused on analyzing the eff ect of changes in corporate (CIT) and personal income taxes (PIT) on GDP growth. The equation takes the following form:
Results in Tab. V show the negative correlation between corporate income taxes and GDP growth even at 1% level. The regression coeffi cient (−1.28) confi rms high negative impact of an increase in the corporate income taxes on GDP growth. Other variables are not statistically signifi cant in this estima- tion. Fig. 2 shows how the actual data correspond to the estimated values (fi tted). We again used information criteria (Akaike info criterion, Schwarz criterion and Hannan-Quinn criterion) for identifi cation. The most appropriate time lag and model with 2 year lags seem to be the most suitable. Estimation with 2 year lag has following form: 
It confi rms the statistically signifi cant negative effect of corporate tax changes on GDP growth at standard level 5% level. The adjusted determination coeffi cient has a value of 20%, and a Durbin-Watson test (1.880) confi rms no autocorrelation of residues. Other variables are not statistically signifi cant.
Economic theory suggests that diff erences in tax burden may play a role in explaining diff erences in economic performance. Nevertheless, it is generally diffi cult to assess the overall eff ect of the tax changes on GDP as, for example, changes in any single tax may simultaneously aff ect several determinants of GDP and its growth. The eff ects of changes in taxation o en depend also on the design of other policies and institutions. The empirical fi ndings show that an increase in taxes has a negative eff ect on GDP growth. Founded regression coeffi cients are in line with conclusions of the studies of Scully (1991 Scully ( , 2000 , Lee and Gordon (2005) , Hill (2008) , Romero-Á vila and Strauch (2008) , Karras and Furceri (2009) .
Although founded regression coeffi cients are relatively high, the changes in tax burden should not be regarded as a single tool aff ecting the economic growth, as the GDP growth is infl uenced by many factors. Nevertheless, values of adjusted the determination coeffi cient (approximately 30%), are relatively high due to the complex nature of GDP growth. 
SUMMARY
The paper analyzed the eff ect of tax changes on GDP growth using adjusted annual data for a panel of 24 European Union members in a period 1995-2008. We have used panel regression with fi xed eff ects as a basic method of research. The panel regression is based on analysis the eff ect of total tax quota changes on GDP growth in model 1, of changes in its components (social contribution, direct and indirect taxes) in model 2 and of corporate income tax quota and personal income tax quota changes in model 3. The empirical fi ndings show that an increase in taxes has a negative eff ect on GDP growth. Founded regression coeffi cients are in line with conclusions of the studies of Scully (1991 Scully ( , 2000 , Lee and Gordon (2005) , Hill (2008) , Romero-Á vila and Strauch (2008) , Karras and Furceri (2009) . The results of empirical tests verify statistically signifi cant negative eff ect of tax burden on GDP growth. Total tax quota increased by 1% decreases the GDP growth rate by 0.29% in the same year. The estimations confi rm a statistically signifi cant negative eff ect of direct tax quota changes on GDP growth as well. A cut in the direct tax quota by 1% raises the GDP growth rate by 0.43%. The model also presents a negative impact of corporate income taxes on GDP growth. The regression coeffi cient (−1.28%) expresses the high negative impact of an increase in the corporate income tax quota on GDP growth. On the other hand, the eff ect of social contribution quota changes on GDP growth is not statistically signifi cant in any estimation. Although founded regression coeffi cients are relatively high, the changes in tax rates should not be regarded as a single tool aff ecting the economic growth, as the GDP growth is infl uenced by many factors. Nevertheless, values of adjusted the determination coeffi cient (approximately 30%) are relatively high due to the complex nature of GDP growth.
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